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Abstract 
This paper examines the economic consequences of public subsidies to listed firms in China. It 
reveals that public subsidies can significantly increase the chance of firm overinvestment. 
However, they do not necessarily resolve the underinvestment problem. These results appear 
robust when we test various types of subsidies separately, as well as when we analyze the 
influence of subsidies on the investment-Q sensitivity. Further investigation shows that dividend 
payout has an important moderating role in this relationship between subsidies and investment. 
Firms with subsidies, especially those that pay higher cash dividends, have lower future stock 
returns and valuations than comparable non-subsidized firms. Overall, the main findings of this 
paper signal a clear government failure to correct market failure in the Chinese capital market. 
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Subsidized Overexpansion of Chinese Firms 
1. Introduction 
For decades, economists have been debating the relative virtues of the free market as 
opposed to state intervention (Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990). Market failure is the standard rationale 
used by governments around the world to justify intervention in resource allocation. Welfare 
economists suggest that self-interested firms underinvest in areas where private costs outweigh 
social returns in the absence of public financial support (Schwartz and Clements, 1999). Critics 
of the “visible hand” claim that government interventions, such as subsidies, bailouts, price 
controls, and regulations, are costly and tend to result in inefficient resource allocation. This is 
referred to as government failure (Datta-Chaudhuri, 1990). Moreover, improper incentives, 
inaccurate information, and poor implementation can lead to undesirable policy outcomes, such 
as unfair competition, rent seeking, moral hazard, and corruption. Consequently, policy makers 
face a choice between two imperfect market outcomes, with or without government intervention. 
Empirical policy evaluations in this strand of literature around the globe generally do not seek 
common concluding evidence in support of either side but, instead, look for more specific 
answers that take into account the country-specific institutional environment. This calls for 
further research in more dynamic economies, particularly developing countries. 
China is ideally suited for this type of policy evaluation because of the enormous size of 
its economy and widespread government influence on enterprise activities and its capital markets 
(Allen et al., 2005; Ezzamel et al., 2007). Using Chinese data, Cull et al. (2017) document some 
recent evidence that the facilitation of financial development by the Chinese government helped 
some firms overcome market failure, but the effect of subsidies is left unexplored.  
As a unique characteristic, the Chinese government provides the listed companies that it 
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supports with pervasive cash subsidies (Lee et al., 2014, 2017; Boeing, 2016; Lim et al., 2017; 
Defever and Riaño, 2017; Howell, 2017). This type of public intervention aims to enhance social 
welfare, but its economic impacts on corporate policies and firm value in China are not clearly 
understood. Several pioneering studies have recently shed some light on these issues. Using an 
interview design and a hand-collected 4,898 firm-year sample on subsidies to Chinese listed 
firms for financial years 2002-2008, Lee et al. (2014) investigate the relevance of subsidies to 
corporate value in the Chinese stock markets. They confirm that subsidies are positively related 
to firm value. Chen et al. (2008), using a sample of 4,437 firm-year observations during the 
1994-2000 period, reveal that local (municipal and provincial) governments in China help listed 
firms with subsidies to manage their earnings with the aim of circumventing central government 
regulations on initial public offerings (IPOs), rights offerings, and delisting. More recently, Lim 
et al. (2017) show the benefits of subsidies in China for securing a lower cost of debt, which 
supports a “certification” hypothesis.1 From a valuation perspective, it is unclear whether the 
value relevance of subsidies documented by Lee at al. (2014) is linked to firms’ capital 
investment or financing decisions. This paper therefore aims to fill the gap and address this issue 
empirically using Chinese listed firms.  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on fiscal policy evaluations in a 
developing country setting and suggests that regulatory intervention had some unintended 
consequences in China’s weak corporate governance environment. Based on a sample of 14,440 
firm-year observations of non-financial listed firms in China between 2006 and 2015, we reveal 
that public subsidies cause significant firm overinvestment but do not reduce firm 
underinvestment. Our results signal government failure to correct market failure. These findings 
                                                             
1 A similar effect has been documented by Meuleman and Maeseneire (2012) on Belgian firms’ cost of equity. 
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appear robust across tests using alternative measures of investment efficiency and samples 
selected using the propensity score matching method. We further report that subsidized firms, 
especially those that pay higher cash dividends, have lower future stock returns and valuations 
than comparable non-subsidized firms.  
One of the main objectives of government intervention through subsidies is to mitigate 
firm underinvestment problems. By subsidizing selected firms/industries, the government hopes 
to offset market imperfections in resource allocation and improve total social welfare (Schwartz 
and Clements, 1999; Lee et al., 2014; Boeing, 2016; Howell, 2017). It is therefore important to 
study firm investment and its relation to government subsidies.  
Accounting disclosures by listed firms enable the accurate measurement of firm 
characteristics available for comprehensive empirical tests. Several earlier studies have 
investigated the determinants of capital investment sensitivity to growth opportunities, measured 
by the Tobin’s Q ratio among Chinese listed firms. For instance, Firth at al. (2008) reveal that 
debt reduces the investment-Q sensitivity, Chen et al. (2011b) show the investment-Q sensitivity 
is weaker among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than non-SOEs and among firms with 
politically connected executives than those without them; Bo et al. (2014) study the influence of 
the 2008 financial crisis on firm investment; and Liu at al. (2015) report that board independence 
increases investment-Q sensitivity. A common limitation of these studies is that the investment-Q 
sensitivity does not differentiate overinvestment from underinvestment. Consequently, these 
studies cannot comment on whether higher investment-Q sensitivity results indicate more 
overinvestment or less underinvestment. At the same time, it is also unclear whether low 
investment-Q sensitivity reduces overinvestment or causes underinvestment. In this paper, we 
adopt the analytical approach of several recent studies on capital investment efficiency, namely, 
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Biddle and Hilary (2006) on US firms, Chen et al. (2011a) on emerging markets (excluding 
China) firms, García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2018) on 24 countries (including China), and 
Shen et al. (2015) and Dai et al. (2016) on Chinese firms. In particular, Shen et al. (2015) use 
mean/median adjusted and model predicted investment efficiency measures that further 
differentiate overinvestment and underinvestment to reveal that earnings management are related 
to overinvestment problems. Dai et al. (2016) document a positive relationship between overseas 
returned talents (Chinese nationals with overseas studying or working experience) on firm 
investment efficiency among Chinese listed firms, particularly firms that are under the control of 
the central government and exhibit overinvestment. 
Irrespective of the empirical method, this strand of literature consistently points out that 
aspects of corporate governance, such as ownership and disclosure quality, have a strong 
influence on capital investment efficiency. The present paper makes an important contribution to 
this literature by testing the effects of public intervention through fiscal subsidies on firm 
investment efficiency in China.2 Because of external screening, monitoring, and auditing by the 
subsidizing agencies (Lee et al., 2014; Boeing, 2016, Howell, 2017; Lim et al., 2017), this type 
of intervention may also be considered a form of public governance on listed companies; hence, 
understanding its effectiveness is of paramount importance for China as well as other developing 
countries with similarly weak institutions and frictional capital markets. Lastly, extant studies 
have documented a constraining effect of dividends on corporate investment in Western 
developed markets, particularly in the US (for a review of this literature, see Ramalingegowda et 
al., 2013). Our paper shows further evidence from China that dividend payouts may moderate the 
                                                             
2 Innovation studies such as Boeing (2016) and Howell (2017) examine R&D (research and development) subsidies 
and the scale of R&D investments in China. Aggregate subsidies, investment efficiency, and related corporate 
financing issues are not examined in these studies. 
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subsidies-investment relationship in an emerging market setting.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the research 
background. Section 3 describes our data and methods. Section 4 reports and interprets our 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Research Background 
According to Allen et al. (2005), China is an important counterexample to the findings in 
the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature: its private sector, where applicable legal and 
financial mechanisms are arguably poorer than in the state sector, has been growing much more 
quickly than the state sector. Alternative governance mechanisms that rely on political 
connections and public subsidies are key to private sector enterprise success (Allen et al., 2005; 
Chen et al., 2011b; Cull et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2014, 2017). China’s stock markets offer a unique 
setting to test competing views on government intervention. Political ideology has been found to 
have strong influence over Chinese listed firms and their regulatory environment (Ezzamel et al., 
2007). The Chinese government holds a majority share in its domestic stock markets, where over 
half the listed firms are under government control at the central or local provincial/municipal 
level. The Chinese government provides listed companies with pervasive financial subsidies, 
primarily in the form of cash grants, to stimulate firm investment in research and development, 
talent employment, environmental protection, exports, as rewards for major tax contributions to 
local governments, and as supports for energy consumption (Allen et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014, 
2017; Boeing, 2016; Defever and Riaño, 2017; Howell, 2017; Lim et al., 2017). Around 75% of 
the listed firms have received government subsidies over the past decade, and state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) receive more subsidies on average in the name of social objectives.  
Accounting studies, such as Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Chen et al. (2011a), reveal that 
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higher-quality financial reporting reduces information asymmetry between managers and outside 
suppliers of capital, thereby reducing the cost of capital and increasing investment efficiency. 
García-Sánchez and García-Meca (2018) suggest that governance mechanisms are effective 
complementary measures to constrain inefficient investment decisions. Consistent with these 
views, in addition to directly reducing financial constraints with the injected cash, government 
subsidies may also reduce the cost of external financing and increase investment efficiency 
among recipient firms because of their “certification effect” in the presence of low-quality 
financial reporting and significant information asymmetry in China (Shen et al., 2015). This is 
because in such an external corporate environment, creditors and equity investors may rely on 
stringent government selection programs and auditing to guide their credit allocation and stock 
investment. For instance, Meuleman and Maeseneire (2012) find that subsidies increase the 
likelihood of raising long-term debt and equity among Belgian firms, and more recently Lim et 
al. (2017) suggest that subsidies reduce the cost of debt financing among Chinese firms.  
However, in practice subsidies are often ineffective (Schwartz and Clements, 1999). They 
may fail to benefit the intended target group or have adverse real welfare and distributional 
implications. Lim et al. (2017) argue that subsidies are used by the Chinese government as a 
policy instrument to direct financial resources to industries and enterprises that it supports. In 
response to the government's subsidies for Chinese enterprises, competitors such as the European 
Union and the US have threatened retaliation for what they view as unfair trade practices, 
resulting in political costs for Chinese producers and consumers. Moreover, Haley and Haley 
(2013) observe that subsidies in China often appear to be ad hoc, and business objectives of 
recipient firms are frequently distorted by political agendas. More recent work, such as Howell 
(2017), also reveals that public subsidies reduce firms' economic performance in China, bringing 
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into question whether the social payoff from the Chinese government’s “picking winners” 
strategy justifies the economic cost. Furthermore, the government selection process also gives 
rise to corruption, a potential barrier to investment growth (Haley and Haley, 2013).3  
In addition to these political concerns, economic concerns also arise with subsidies. 
Schwartz and Clements (1999) point out that, by severing the link between prices and production 
costs, subsidies often result in an inefficient allocation of resources, leading to overproduction of 
subsidized goods. These conditions lead to potential rent-seeking by subsidized firms, 
particularly through overinvestment, i.e., managerial empire building (Hope et al. 2008). In a 
similar vein, Lim et al. (2017) find that, although subsidies reduce the cost of debt among 
Chinese listed firms, such firms tend to be overstaffed and fail to achieve superior financial 
performance. In addition to these unintended consequences, scholars also found that public 
subsidies may crowd out private investment, meaning that firms replace their own capital using 
subsidies (for reviews, see David et al., 2000; Marino et al., 2016).  
3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Sample and Measures 
Our data are collected from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database. The Chinese Accounting Standards Committee (2006) has required mandatory 
disclosures of government cash subsidies to listed firms since 2006. Our sample includes all A-
share non-financial listed firms for the period 2006-2015.4 In line with Lee at al. (2014) on the 
                                                             
3 Lee et al. (2017) shows that political cost considerations influence firms’ decisions to disclose corporate social 
responsibility information in China, especially in regions with a higher level of corruption. 
4 Listed firms in China have issued A- and B-shares in the mainland domestic market and H-shares in Hong Kong. 
Among about 3,000 listed firms traded in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges now, only about 100 firms have 
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value relevance of subsidies, Lee et al. (2017) on the influence of subsidies on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure and Lim et al. (2017) on subsidies and cost of debt and firm 
performance and in China, we consider the total value of various non-tax subsidies received by 
firm i during year t scaled by the lagged value of total assets, denoted 
Sub
Assetsit
, when examining 
the influence of subsidies on corporate investment, dividends, and stock market refinancing 
decisions.5 In addition to total non-tax subsidy values, we compute an alternative total subsidy 
value inclusive of all tax rebates and reliefs received by sample firm/years using CSMAR data. 
Furthermore, we manually classify individual items of subsidies to each firm/year observation 
into R&D (research and development) subsidies and non-R&D subsidies. Their respective total 
values are computed and scaled by total assets for further robustness tests. 
When investigating firm capital investment, we follow Chen et al. (2011b) and measure 
Chinese firms’ investments as cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-
term assets from the cash flow statements minus cash receipts from selling these assets. We also 




In light of Biddle et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011a), Shen et al. (2015), Dai et al. (2016), 






 for firm i in year t as a function of growth opportunities, as measured by the 
percentage sales growth rate Sal. Growthit−1, for firm i in year t - 1 as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
issued B-shares, which were originally reserved for foreign investors before this restriction was lifted in 2001. Most 
B-share firms also have issued A-shares. 
5 When scaling subsidies, dividends, and capital investments by total sales, we find similar results. 





= α0 + α1NEGit−1 + α2Sal. Growthit−1 + α3NEGit−1 ∗ Sal. Growthit−1 + α4INDi + εit.   
--- Equation (1). 
In Equation (1), we allow for differential predictability for revenue increases and revenue 
decreases by including a dummy indicator of negative sales revenue growth for firm i in year t - 
1 NEGit−1, which takes a value of 1 for negative growth, and 0 otherwise. We also control for 
industry-fixed effects using industry dummy INDi according to industry classifications by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We then calculate the measure of investment 
efficiency (Inv.Eff) as follows: 
Inv.Eff = − |
Inv
Assets




For robustness, we adopt an additional measure of investment efficiency based on the 
deviation of actual firm-year investment from industry-year median investment, namely, 
adjusted-investment efficiency (Adj-Inv.Eff) as follows: 
Adj-Inv.Eff = − |
Inv
Assets




3.2. Empirical Models 
To simultaneously account for the endogeneity of subsidies, corporate investment, and 
firm-level control variables, we use the two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond 
(1998) dynamic panel-data system estimator with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust 
standard errors to estimate a model of firm investment (or investment efficiency): 
Inv
Assetsit












∗ Gov. Cont𝑖𝑡 +
µGov. Cont𝑖𝑡 + δControlsit + εit.  
--- Equation (2). 
For dynamic model specification, we control for two lags of the dependent variables in Equation 
11 
 
(2). Consequently, the coefficients on the remaining independent variables represent the 
contemporaneous impact of the independent variables on firm investment (and investment 
efficiency) conditional on the full history of investment (and investment efficiency) information 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). To differentiate SOEs from non-SOEs, we include a Gov.Cont 




∗ Gov. Cont in the model. Following extant studies on firm investment, such 
as Almeida and Campello (2007), Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011a, 2011b), Controlsit 
represents other control variables, including the total cash dividend scaled by the lagged total 
assets div/assets, Tobin’s Q, the log of market capitalization Log(mktcap), market value based 
financial leverage, return on assets, the percentage of tangible assets in total assets (asset 
tangibility), sales growth, the percentage shareholding of the largest shareholder (No1SH), board 
size, and board independence. In Equation (2), α𝑖  denotes firm-fixed effects, and εit  is the 
regression error. We first difference all the variables to remove unobserved heterogeneity α𝑖 and 
eliminate potential omitted variable bias and use lagged values of the endogenous variables as 
instruments for estimation. To ensure that the dynamic general method of moments (GMM) 
method is correctly specified, we conduct the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals and Hansen's overidentification test. Because of first differencing, 
first-order autocorrelation is expected. For brevity, we report only the second-order serial 
correlation test AR(2).  
 (Insert Table 1 here) 
We perform an additional test in light of existing studies on investment-Q sensitivity 
(Firth at al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011b; Bo et al., 2014; and Liu at al., 2015) as follows: 
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Invit = α + β1Tobin
′s Qit ∗ Sub/Assetsit + β2Tobin
′s Qit + β3Sub/Assetsit + δControlsit
+ εit 
--- Equation (3). 
In particular, coefficient β1  captures the influence of subsidies on the sensitivity of firm 
investment to growth opportunities. 
3.3. Sample Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in this study. We winsorize all 
continuous variables at the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile to control for outliers. Among 
sample firms, 75% receive public subsidies. The average ratio of subsidy to assets is 0.53% (or 
0.70% among recipients) and ratio of investment to assets is 6.55%. On average, around 20% of 
subsidies are granted towards research and development activities. The investment efficiency 
measure computed using Equation (1) has a mean of -4.79% (the ratio is reversed so that larger 
values indicate higher investment efficiency). Following Biddle et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011a), 
Shen et al. (2015), and Dai et al. (2016), we compute measures of overinvestment 
(underinvestment) equal to firm-year investment minus model predicted investment (model 
predicted investment minus firm-year investment) for the respective overinvested and 
underinvested subsamples. In Table 1, overinvestment (Over.Inv) is more prevalent than 
underinvestment (Under.Inv), with larger subsample means and standard deviations. Among 
sample firm-years, 59% have paid cash dividends with an average cash dividend to the lagged 
total assets ratio of 1.17%, and 10% have made seasoned equity offerings (SEO). Net operating 
cash flows on average account for 4.91% of the lagged total asset values (OPCF/assets), and 
4.51% after deducting the capital investment cash flows from net operating cash flows (OPCF-
Inv)/assets). Regarding ownership and control, 52% of firm-years are under government control 
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(SOEs), and the largest shareholder on average held 35.53% of shares (No1SH).  
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Correlation coefficients among the variables are then reported in Table 2. The sub/assets 
ratio appears to be positively correlated with Inv/assets, Over.inv, and negatively correlated with 
Inv.eff, indicating likely causality between subsidies and firm overinvestment problems. Also in 
line with our prediction that public subsidies to Chinese listed firms facilitate cash dividend 
payouts due to mandatory cash dividend requirements prior to SEOs in China, the sub/assets 
ratio appears to be positively correlated with div/assets.  
4. Results 
4.1. Subsidies and Capital Investment 
We test the influence of subsidies on firm investment and investment efficiency in Table 
3. Model 1 shows that 
Sub
Assetsit




, and model 2 further suggests that 
Sub
Assetsit
 significantly decreases investment 
efficiency Inv. Effit. According to Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011a), overinvestment 
arises when firms accept projects with negative net present value (NPV) whereas 
underinvestment occurs when firms forgo positive NPV projects. Consistent with these 
differential implications, we divide the sample into subsamples for overinvestment and 
underinvestment to test the determinants of overinvestment and underinvestment separately in 
models 3 and 4. We find that subsidies significantly increase overinvestment in model 3 but have 
no impact on underinvestment in model 4. Clearly, these results are in line with models 1 and 2 
as well as correlation coefficients reported earlier together, indicating more prevalent 






Gov. Cont generally show that these effects are stronger among non-SOEs, but this interaction is 
statistically significant only in model 3, indicating a less severe overinvestment problem due to 
subsidies to SOEs. The Chinese Accounting Standard (2006) excludes the capital invested by the 
government as the partial owner of the enterprise from subsidies to listed firms. As listed SOEs 
are funded primarily by public financial resources, this weaker marginal influence of public 
subsidies on their investment decisions are expected.  
We then conduct a robustness check considering the endogeneity of the government 
screening process for granting subsidies (Boeing, 2016). We use the propensity score matching 
(PSM) method to match firms receiving subsidies against firms not receiving subsidies, 
classified by “sub dummy,” using Gov.Cont, No1SH, Log(mktcap), Tobin’s Q, return on assets, 
and industry and year dummies as matching variables. Regressions results based on this PSM 
sample reported in models 5 and 6 are highly consistent with models 3 and 4. We conclude that 
government subsidies are associated with corporate overinvestment, particularly among private 
sector firms. Lastly, investment and investment efficiency appear to be very persistent, especially 
compared to their first lagged values. The Arellano-Bond AR(2) tests suggest that second-order 
serial correlations are insignificant. The Hansen’s overidentification test (Hansen) fails to reject 
the hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
In Table 4, we conduct a robustness test using the industry-year-median adjusted 
investment efficiency measure Adj-Inv.Eff and, consistently, the adjusted overinvestment and 
underinvestment measures. Across the five regressions, the coefficients on 
Sub
Assetsit
 and the 
subsidy dummy are all statistically significant, suggesting that subsidies to private firms reduce 
investment efficiency by increasing both overinvestment and underinvestment. The coefficients 
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on the interactions 
Sub
Assetsit
∗ Gov. Cont and Sub Dummy ∗ Gov. Cont indicate that this effect is 
weaker among SOEs than non-SOEs in models 1 and 4. Although the positive impact of 
subsidies on underinvestment observed in Table 4 appears different from the Table 3 results, 
neither table shows evidence of reduced underinvestment problem due to subsidies. These 
additional results further (and more strongly) confirm that subsidies have not been effective in 
mitigating inefficient investment. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 Pioneering studies such as Lee et al. (2014, 2017) and Lim et al. (2017), examining the 
influences of subsidies on corporate finance issues in China, have studied tax-based subsidies 
and non-tax-based subsidies. In light of this recent work, we conduct a robustness test using 
alternative total subsidy values that include the amount of tax rebates and reliefs listed firms 
receive as additional forms of government subsidies. According to notes to financial reporting 
information compiled by the CSMAR database, among our sample firm-years, 843 observations 
have received tax rebates or tax reliefs. The average value of tax rebates or relief is RMB 6.46 
million. 7  We repeat regressions in Tables 3 and 4 to re-examine the impact of subsidies 
(including tax rebates and relief) on firm investment efficiency. Results from this robustness test 
reported in Table 5 appear very similar to those in Tables 3 and 4. We reconfirm that, although 
subsidies increase firm capital investment, they reduce investment efficiency by facilitating 
overinvestment but fail to correct underinvestment. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 Furthermore, in Table 6 we re-examine the influences of R&D subsidies and non-R&D 
subsidies on firm investment efficiency separately. Results are highly consistent with those 
                                                             
7 The standard deviation is RMB 30 million and the maximum value is RMB 443.62 million. 
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reported earlier. First, in Panel A, we consider subsidies that are not in tax forms and not granted 
towards R&D activities. Models 1a&3a suggest a positive subsidy-overinvestment link and 
models 2a&4a indicate underinvestment is not corrected and likely exacerbated among high 
subsidies firms. Second, in Panel B, we further show that even R&D subsidies are positively and 
significantly associated with capital assets overinvestment in models 1b&3b whereas not related 
to underinvestment in models 2b&4b. These results again lend support to the use of total 
subsidies values in our baseline analysis. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
We conduct an additional set of regressions to account for the influence of cash dividend 
payments on the concurrent subsidies-investment efficiency link documented so far. Regressions 
reported in Table 7 further include a cash dividend payer dummy payer and its interaction with 
the sub/assets ratio in our models. Models 1 and 3 show that the positive subsidy-overinvestment 
link is weaker among cash dividend payers, given the negative and significant coefficients on the 
interaction sub/assets*payer. This is in line with the constraining effect of dividends on capital 
investment efficiency (Ramalingegowda et al., 2013). But the coefficient on sub/asset*payer is 
much smaller than that on sub/assets, indicating that the constraining effect of dividends on 
overinvestment weakens, instead of eliminates, the positive subsidies-overinvestment link. In 
models 2 and 4, the interaction sub/assets*payer is positive and significant whereas sub/assets is 
negative and significant in determining concurrent underinvestment. The coefficient on 
sub/assets*payer in model 2 is 0.898 and that on sub/asset is -1.132, together indicating that the 
ineffectiveness of using subsidies to correct underinvestment can be largely explained by cash 
dividend payouts. For non-payers (payer = 0), subsidies significantly reduce underinvestment by 
1.132% of total assets, thus they appear effective in correcting market failure. 
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(Insert Table 7 here) 
To shed further light on the subsidies and firm investment relationship, we also follow 
existing studies on investment-Q sensitivity (Firth at al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011b; Bo et al., 
2014; and Liu at al., 2015) by conducting a test consistent with this strand of literature. The 
regressions reported in Table 8 are in line with our analysis so far. We notice in models 1a&1b, 
the coefficients on the interaction Sub/Assets*Tobin's Q is negative and significant suggesting 
that subsidies reduce the investment-Q sensitivity. This influence appears to be driven by non-
SOEs (models 3a&3b). For SOEs, subsidies do not affect the investment-Q sensitivity (models 
2a&2b). As expected, subsidies are positively and significantly associated with capital 
investment among non-SOEs. All in all, these additional tests support our main findings that 
subsidies are ineffective in correcting firm investment inefficiency. 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
4.2. Subsidies and Firm Performance 
 Last but not the least, we analyze the performance of subsidized firms relative to 
comparable non-subsidized firms. We perform two sets of random-effects regressions using the 
PSM sample described earlier. In Table 9, we show that subsidized firms underperform otherwise 
comparable non-subsidized firms. This basic finding is consistent with recent studies, such as 
Lim et al. (2017) and Howell (2017). Panel A regressions use the one-year-ahead Jensen’s alpha 
(Jensen, 1968), computed based on daily stock and Shanghai Stock Composite Index returns as 
the dependent variable, and Panel B regressions use the one-year-ahead Tobin’s Q ratio as the 
dependent variable.8 In both panels, we find that sub dummy consistently shows a negative and 
                                                             
8 The mean alpha of this PSM-matched sample is 0.27 (standard deviation 0.47), and the average Tobin’s Q is 2.98 
(standard deviation 2.55). 
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significant impact on these performance measures. Panel A shows that stock returns of 
subsidized firms on average earn about 3% less per year than comparable non-subsidized firms. 
Panel B suggests that the Tobin’s Q ratios of subsidized firms are on average lower than 
comparable non-subsidized firms by 0.4 times.  
(Insert Table 9 here) 
In addition, models 2 and 3 in these panels show that the underperformance in terms of 
stock returns and firm valuations is robust for both the overinvested and underinvested 
subsamples. Model 4 in these panels further include the investment efficiency ratio (Inv.Eff) as 
independent variable, and the result on sub dummy is not affected while investment efficiency is 
positively associated with firm stock returns in Panel A. Model 5 in these panels then takes 
account of both dividend and investment efficiency when explaining future firm performance. 
We find that subsidies remain a negative determinant of both Jensen’s alpha and Tobin’s Q. 
Firms that pay high dividends and have high investment efficiency perform better in the future. 
Furthermore, the interaction sub dummy*div/assets in model 5 appears negative and significant, 
indicating that subsidized firms that pay high cash dividends perform even worse than subsidized 
non-payers.  
5. Conclusion 
Subsidies to listed firms have been used frequently by the Chinese government to 
intervene in the capital market. A large number of firms have received cash subsidies as a means 
of government resource reallocation and an effort to correct market failure. Using investment as 
the key dependent variable and dividing investment into overinvestment and underinvestment, 
this study empirically investigates the impact of government intervention on firm behavior.  
Our empirical evidence shows that subsidized firms, particularly those in the private 
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sector, are associated with significant overinvestment, whereas no supporting evidence shows 
reduced underinvestment. These findings indicate government failure in correcting market failure 
through subsidies in China. We further report that subsidized firms, especially those paying 
higher cash dividends, have lower future stock returns, and lower valuation than comparable 
non-subsidized firms. 
Evidence revealed in this paper indicates that weak firm governance may significantly 
weaken the effectiveness of public policies aimed at stimulating corporate investment and 
improving social welfare. Mechanisms such as markets for corporate control, financial reporting 
quality, internal governance structure, and external public monitoring cannot easily be 
substituted. Further reforms aimed at improving minority shareholder protection in China appear 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of variables. 
This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. As the number of observations 
varies with the regressions, we report these statistics based on the regression with the largest number of 
observations. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sub. Dummy 14,440 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Sub/Assets 14,440 0.53 0.90 0 5.52 
R&D Sub/Assets 14,440 0.11 0.24 0 1.42 
Log(1+Sub) 14,440 1.92 1.66 0 9.30 
Inv/Assets 14,440 6.55 7.43 0 44.54 
Inv.Eff 14,440 -4.79 4.77 -31.30 0 
Over.Inv 4,717 6.81 7.37 0 31.30 
Under.Inv 9,723 3.80 2.09 0 8.40 
Payer Dummy 14,440 0.59 0.49 0 1 
Div/Assets 14,440 1.17 1.84 0 10.29 
Log(1+Div) 14,440 2.28 2.19 0 11.05 
SEO 14,440 0.10 0.29 0 1 
OPCF/Assets 14,440 4.91 9.59 -26.78 36.95 
(OPCF-Inv)/Assets 14,440 4.51 9.58 -28.10 35.98 
Log(Market Cap.) 14,440 8.52 0.99 6.38 11.35 
Leverage 14,440 27.77 20.41 0.93 78.73 
Return on Assets 14,440 5.57 6.83 -20.08 28.78 
Asset Tangibility 14,440 41.48 22.23 0 92.41 
Sales Growth 14,440 13.04 34.71 -58.56 181.93 
Gov. Control 14,440 0.52 0.50 0 1 
No1SH 14,440 35.53 15.19 8.80 75.00 
Board Size 14,440 8.89 1.79 5 15 
Board Ind. 14,440 37.04 5.29 28.57 57.14 






Table 2: The correlations matrix. 
See Appendix A for variable descriptions. Due to large sample size, almost all correlations are above 5% statistically significant. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) Payer Dummy 1.00                                          
(2) Div/Assets 0.53  1.00  
                   
(3) Log(1+Div) 0.87  0.66  1.00  
                  
(4) Inv/Assets 0.12  0.13  0.12  1.00  
                 
(5) Inv.Eff 0.02  -0.03  0.02  -0.72  1.00  
                
(6) Over.Inv -0.01  0.04  -0.01  0.96  -1.00  1.00  
               
(7) Under.Inv -0.14  -0.06  -0.14  -0.59  -1.00  . 1.00  
              
(8) Sub Dummy 0.12  0.05  0.09  0.04  0.02  -0.02  -0.03  1.00  
             
(9) Sub/Assets 0.01  0.06  -0.01  0.13  -0.10  0.14  0.00  0.34  1.00  
            
(10) Log(1+Sub) 0.12  0.05  0.21  0.08  0.01  0.00  -0.06  0.67  0.59  1.00  
           
(11) OPCF/Assets 0.17  0.34  0.24  0.23  -0.13  0.18  -0.03  -0.03  0.05  0.03  1.00  
          
(12) (OPCF-Inv)/Assets 0.17  0.33  0.25  0.18  -0.09  0.13  -0.02  -0.03  0.05  0.04  1.00  1.00  
         
(13) Log(Market Cap.) 0.20  0.24  0.45  0.11  -0.01  0.05  -0.10  0.22  0.06  0.45  0.18  0.20  1.00  
        
(14) Leverage -0.04  -0.28  0.05  -0.02  0.03  0.00  -0.10  -0.06  -0.13  0.17  -0.14  -0.12  0.01  1.00  
       
(15) Return on Assets 0.37  0.52  0.44  0.19  -0.06  0.12  -0.11  0.04  0.12  0.08  0.38  0.37  0.31  -0.22  1.00  
      
(16) Asset Tangibility 0.22  0.32  0.13  0.01  0.02  -0.06  0.02  0.09  0.07  -0.08  0.11  0.10  -0.04  -0.69  0.22  1.00  
     
(17) Sales Growth 0.12  0.11  0.11  0.13  -0.06  0.09  -0.09  0.04  0.06  0.01  0.07  0.06  0.10  -0.04  0.27  -0.04  1.00  
    
(18) Gov. Control -0.04  -0.11  0.05  -0.03  0.01  0.00  0.02  -0.12  -0.07  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.12  0.33  -0.07  -0.23  -0.09  1.00  
   
(19) No1SH 0.15  0.13  0.24  0.04  -0.01  0.02  -0.04  0.02  -0.03  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.25  0.15  0.11  -0.02  -0.01  0.21  1.00  
  
(20) Board Size 0.08  0.04  0.16  0.08  -0.01  0.01  -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.18  0.21  0.04  -0.13  -0.01  0.27  0.05  1.00  
 
(21) Board Ind. -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.05  -0.04  -0.04  0.07  -0.02  -0.03  0.02  0.02  -0.07  0.04  -0.40  1.00  
(22) Tobin’s Q -0.15  0.09  -0.17  -0.05  -0.03  0.02  0.12  -0.04  0.11  -0.14  0.05  0.03  0.07  -0.55  0.08  0.18  0.05  -0.24  -0.15  -0.18  0.08  
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Table 3: Government subsidy and firm investment and investment efficiency. 
This table reports two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel-data system-GMM 
estimator regressions with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors. The dependent variables are capital 
investment scaled by total assets in model 1 and investment efficiency measures computed as in Biddle et al. (2009) and 
Chen et al. (2011a) in models 2-6. Overinvestment (underinvestment) equals firm-year investment minus model predicted 
investment (model predicted investment minus firm-year investment) in these subsample tests. We include two lags of the 
dependent variable in the GMM models and report Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation AR(2) and Hansen’s 
overidentification tests. Models 1 and 2 are based on all sample firm-years, models 3 and 5 are based on only the firm-
years overinvested, and models 4 and 6 are based on only the firm-years underinvested. Models 5 and 6 are further 
restricted for a matched sample obtained from the PSM method. We match firms receiving subsidies against firms not 
receiving subsidies, classified by “Sub. Dummy” based on Gov. Control, No1SH, Log(Market Cap.), Tobin’s Q, return on 
assets, industry, and year dummies. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dep. Var. Inv/Assets Inv.Eff Over.Inv Under.Inv Over.Inv Under.Inv 
Sample All All Overinvested Underinvested PSM PSM 
Sub/Assets 0.914** -0.863*** 3.701*** -0.564 
  
 
(2.48) (-2.81) (5.37) (-1.23) 
  Sub/Assets*Gov.Cont -0.761* 0.593 -1.773** 0.878* 
  
 
(-1.80) (1.60) (-1.98) (1.83) 
  Sub.Dummy 
    
3.677*** 0.271 
     
(2.74) (1.07) 
Sub Dummy*Gov.Cont 
    
-2.827 0.335 
     
(-1.58) (1.01) 
Gov.Cont 1.255** -0.978** 0.974 -1.106 1.704 -0.102 
 (2.12) (-2.29) (0.78) (-1.32) (0.54) (-0.34) 
Div/Assets 0.024 0.129 -0.050 -0.267** 0.893 -0.321*** 
 
(0.19) (1.38) (-0.18) (-2.11) (0.76) (-2.85) 
Tobin’s Q 0.011 -0.111 -0.601*** 0.068 -0.143 0.088* 
 
(0.14) (-1.58) (-2.89) (1.05) (-0.39) (1.78) 
Log(mktcap) -0.965*** 0.364*** 2.300*** 0.665*** 1.190 -0.288** 
 
(-8.25) (3.46) (5.08) (5.78) (0.73) (-1.98) 
Leverage -0.028** 0.018* 0.002 0.009 -0.018 0.001 
 
(-2.54) (1.71) (0.08) (0.62) (-0.28) (0.12) 
Return on Assets 0.186*** -0.118*** 0.241*** 0.002 0.235 -0.030 
 
(5.64) (-4.23) (3.15) (0.05) (0.71) (-1.33) 
Asset Tangibility 0.005 0.013 0.009 -0.007 -0.062 0.014* 
 
(0.55) (1.38) (0.29) (-0.58) (-0.65) (1.72) 
Sales Growth 0.010* 0.004 0.039*** -0.027*** 0.013 -0.020*** 
 
(1.83) (1.02) (4.22) (-4.20) (0.61) (-5.73) 
No1SH -0.019 0.015 0.008 -0.023 -0.055 0.012 
 
(-0.87) (0.64) (0.16) (-0.62) (-0.24) (0.81) 
Board Size 0.261 0.234* -0.462 -0.349** 0.220 -0.127 
 
(1.63) (1.65) (-1.46) (-2.12) (0.16) (-0.88) 
Board Ind. -0.021 0.016 -0.107 0.017 -0.162 0.049 
 
(-0.46) (0.46) (-1.22) (0.44) (-0.23) (1.13) 
L.Inv/Assets 0.366*** 
     
 
(18.60) 
     L2.Inv/Assets 0.019 
     
 
(1.59) 






    
  
(9.37) 
    L2.Inv.Eff 
 
-0.016 
    
  
(-1.22) 






































Constant 8.971*** -9.285*** -10.449* 1.940 0.395 4.437* 
 
(3.10) (-4.04) (-1.65) (0.77) (0.01) (1.76) 
AR(2) 0.79 0.83 0.59 0.34 0.75 0.71 
Hansen 0.38 0.31 0.29 0.21 0.27 0.29 
Obs. 14,438 12,087 3,686 8,401 1,801 4,035 






Table 4: Government subsidy and industry-year-median-adjusted investment efficiency. 
This table reports two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel-data system-
GMM estimator regressions with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors. The dependent variables 
are industry-year-median adjusted investment efficiency measures scaled by total assets. The adjusted 
overinvestment (underinvestment) Adj-Over.Inv (Adj-Under.Inv) equals to firm-year investment scaled by total 
assets minus the industry-year-median capital investment to assets ratio in these subsample tests. We include two 
lags of the dependent variable in the GMM models and report Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation AR(2) 
and Hansen’s overidentification tests. Model 1 is based on all sample firm-years, models 2 and 4 are based on only 
the firm-years overinvested, and models 3 and 5 are based on only the firm-years underinvested. Models 4 and 5 
are further restricted for a matched sample obtained from the PSM method. We match firms receiving subsidies 
against firms not receiving subsidies, classified by “Sub. Dummy” based on Gov. Control, No1SH, Log(Market 
Cap.), Tobin’s Q, return on assets, industry, and year dummies. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. t-
statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dep. Var. Adj-Inv.Eff Adj-Over.Inv Adj-Under.Inv Adj-Over.Inv Adj-Under.Inv 
Sample All Overinvested Underinvested PSM PSM 
Sub/Assets -1.066*** 2.982*** 0.270** 
  
 
(-3.29) (5.42) (2.10) 
  Sub/Assets*Gov.Cont 0.933*** -1.145 0.059 
  
 
(2.67) (-1.43) (0.32) 
  Sub.Dummy 
   
2.218*** 0.453** 
    
(3.08) (2.09) 
Sub Dummy*Gov.Cont 
   
-2.910*** 0.088 
    
(-2.98) (0.33) 
Gov.Cont -1.795*** 3.063*** 1.001*** 3.306*** 0.600** 
 
(-3.78) (3.44) (3.73) (2.96) (2.29) 
Div/Assets 0.056 0.395* 0.120** 0.971*** 0.087 
 
(0.61) (1.68) (2.22) (3.54) (1.45) 
Tobin’s Q -0.086 -0.353** 0.079*** -0.079 0.070** 
 
(-1.37) (-1.97) (2.71) (-0.48) (2.34) 
Log(mktcap) 1.062*** 0.218 -0.844*** 0.120 -1.020*** 
 
(10.26) (0.76) (-11.47) (0.30) (-11.81) 
Leverage 0.030*** -0.044** -0.013*** -0.021 -0.021*** 
 
(3.35) (-2.00) (-2.61) (-0.86) (-4.16) 
Return on Assets -0.107*** 0.148** -0.014 0.136** 0.007 
 
(-4.11) (2.18) (-1.13) (2.19) (0.54) 
Asset Tangibility 0.013* -0.025 -0.013*** -0.025 -0.020*** 
 
(1.76) (-1.14) (-2.91) (-0.88) (-4.21) 
Sales Growth -0.008** 0.003 0.012*** 0.001 0.009*** 
 
(-2.14) (0.43) (6.34) (0.10) (4.84) 
No1SH 0.009 -0.065** -0.005 -0.106*** -0.002 
 
(0.47) (-2.02) (-0.49) (-2.71) (-0.27) 
Board Size 0.077 0.226 0.058 0.384 0.063 
 
(0.60) (0.75) (0.74) (1.47) (0.86) 
Board Ind. 0.026 -0.073 -0.021 -0.177** -0.017 
 
(0.72) (-1.08) (-1.01) (-2.17) (-0.88) 
L.Adj-Inv.Eff 0.254*** 
    
 
(13.20) 
    L2. Adj-Inv.Eff -0.002 
    
 
(-0.21) 









































Constant -13.143*** 4.002 9.706*** 8.725* 11.426*** 
 
(-5.53) (0.83) (6.70) (1.69) (8.07) 
AR(2) 0.80 0.53 0.29 0.44 0.79 
Hansen 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.39 
Obs. 14,438 6,505 4,604 3,151 4,604 






Table 5: Robustness test: the influence of subsidies (including tax rebates and reliefs) on firm investment efficiency. 
This table reports a robustness test using alternative total subsidy values. Among our sample firm-years, 843 observations have received 
tax rebates or tax reliefs. The average value of tax rebates or reliefs is RMB 6.46 million. We re-examine the influence of subsidies 
(including tax rebates and reliefs) on firm investment efficiency. All models are two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond 
(1998) dynamic panel-data system-GMM estimator regressions with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors. We 
include two lags of the dependent variable in the GMM models and report Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation AR(2) and 
Hansen’s overidentification tests. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Dep. Var.  


















        Sub/Assets 0.981*** -0.878*** 3.574*** -0.649* -1.060*** 3.007*** 0.307** 
 
(3.13) (-3.64) (5.44) (-1.73) (-4.10) (6.10) (2.49) 
Sub/Assets*Gov.Cont. -0.665 0.531 -1.527* 1.059** 0.816** -1.013 -0.028 
 
(-1.62) (1.57) (-1.77) (2.51) (2.42) (-1.33) (-0.16) 
Gov.Cont 1.319*** -0.977*** 0.739 -1.354*** -1.704*** 2.854*** 1.097*** 
 
(2.81) (-2.84) (0.65) (-3.09) (-4.61) (3.27) (4.12) 
L.Inv/Assets 0.370*** 
      
 
(19.21) 
      L2.Inv/Assets 0.018* 
      
 
(1.66) 








































 L.Under.Inv (or L.Adj-Under.Inv) 








L2.Under.Inv (or L2.Adj-Under.Inv) 








Constant 8.162*** -9.343*** -9.266 2.749 -12.557*** 3.881 9.446*** 
 
(3.21) (-4.45) (-1.48) (1.17) (-6.08) (0.82) (6.66) 
        Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.80 0.77 0.64 0.33 0.82 0.50 0.29 
Hansen 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.25 
Obs. 14,359 12,018 3,669 8,349 14,359 6,481 4,564 






Table 6: Robustness test: non-R&D subsidies, R&D subsidies, and capital investment efficiency. 
This table reports a robustness test using alternative subsidy values. We re-examine the influence of non-R&D subsidies (excluding 
tax rebates and reliefs) in Panel A and R&D subsidies in Panel B on firm investment efficiency separately. All models are two-step 
Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel-data system-GMM estimator regressions with Windmeijer 
(2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors. We include two lags of the dependent variable in the GMM models and report 
Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation AR(2) and Hansen’s overidentification tests. See Appendix A for variable 
descriptions. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Panel A: Non-R&D subsidies 
 
Panel B: R&D subsidies 
 
Model 1a 2a 3a 4a 1b 2b 3b 4b 



























                  
Sub/Assets 4.113*** -0.359 2.981*** 0.277** 3.432** -3.281* 6.147*** 1.080 
 
(4.81) (-1.02) (4.66) (2.01) (1.99) (-1.88) (3.17) (1.51) 
Sub/Assets*Gov.Cont. -2.031* 0.548 -1.228 0.164 1.545 2.844 0.083 -1.671* 
 
(-1.86) (1.29) (-1.33) (0.80) (0.47) (1.41) (0.03) (-1.68) 
Gov.Cont 0.722 -0.821** 2.359*** 0.987*** -1.894 -1.645*** 1.404 1.302*** 
 
(0.61) (-2.16) (2.77) (3.81) (-1.44) (-3.29) (1.54) (4.49) 


































































Constant -9.685 2.253 5.334 9.739*** -7.064 2.041 1.823 10.267*** 
 
(-1.55) (0.97) (1.14) (6.86) (-1.02) (0.83) (0.40) (7.37) 
                  
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.63 0.19 0.54 0.32 0.40 0.99 0.36 0.21 
Hansen 0.35 0.11 0.37 0.22 0.39 0.33 0.41 0.17 
Obs. 3,686 8,401 6,505 4,604 3,686 8,401 6,505 4,604 




Table 7: The effects of cash dividend payout on the subsidies and investment efficiency relationship. 
This table reports regressions further including a dummy variable “payer” that equals 1 for firm-years paid cash 
dividend and 0 for non-payers. All models are two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) 
dynamic panel-data system-GMM estimator regressions with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard 
errors. We include two lags of the dependent variable in the GMM models and report Arellano-Bond second-
order serial correlation AR(2) and Hansen’s overidentification tests. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. 
T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Dep. Var. Over.Inv Under.Inv Adj-Over.Inv Adj-Under.Inv 
Sample Overinvested Underinvested Overinvested Underinvested 
          
Sub/Assets*payer -1.971*** 0.898*** -2.373*** -0.163* 
 (-2.94) (2.83) (-3.78) (-1.71) 
Sub/Assets 4.325*** -1.132*** 4.203*** 0.348** 
 
(5.83) (-2.77) (6.05) (2.50) 
Sub/Assets*Gov.Cont -1.625** 0.839** -1.527** 0.040 
 
(-1.98) (2.04) (-2.00) (0.21) 
Payer 0.393 0.169 0.358 -0.648*** 
 
(0.41) (0.43) (0.58) (-3.55) 
Div/Assets 0.222 -0.356** 0.543** 0.274*** 
 
(0.78) (-2.24) (2.22) (4.12) 


































     Constant -9.474 1.162 4.532 9.231*** 
 
(-1.64) (0.47) (1.02) (6.80) 
     Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.79 0.11 0.60 0.15 
Hansen 0.31 0.38 0.33 0.27 
Obs. 3,686 8,401 6,505 4,604 






Table 8: Subsidies and investment-Q sensitivity. 
All models are two-step Arellano and Bover (1995)/Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic panel-data system-GMM estimator 
regressions with Windmeijer (2005) bias-corrected robust standard errors. We include two lags of the dependent variable in 
the GMM models and report Arellano-Bond second-order serial correlation AR(2) and Hansen’s overidentification tests. 
Other control variables include Gov.Cont, Div/Assets, Log(mktcap), Leverage, Return on Assets, Asset Tangibility, Sales 
Growth, No1SH, Board Size, and Board Ind. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. T-statistics in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Panel A: Total subsidies Panel B: non-R&D subsidies 
Model 1a 2a 3a 1b 2b 3b 
Dep. Var. Inv/Assets Inv/Assets Inv/Assets Inv/Assets Inv/Assets Inv/Assets 
Sample All SOE Non-SOE All SOE Non-SOE 
              
Sub/Assets*Tobin's Q -0.105* -0.069 -0.140** -0.129** -0.086 -0.184*** 
 
(-1.87) (-0.38) (-2.46) (-2.26) (-0.36) (-3.11) 
Sub/Assets 1.200*** 0.467 1.721*** 1.191*** 0.613 1.905*** 
 
(2.76) (0.89) (4.53) (2.62) (0.92) (4.34) 
Tobin's Q 0.115 0.042 0.062 0.108 0.063 0.070 
 
(1.29) (0.26) (0.60) (1.29) (0.42) (0.69) 
L1.Inv/Assets 0.364*** 0.378*** 0.338*** 0.368*** 0.373*** 0.336*** 
 
(18.80) (14.23) (12.69) (19.18) (13.84) (12.22) 
L2.Inv/Assets 0.019* 0.022 0.002 0.020* 0.020 0.002 
 
(1.77) (1.37) (0.15) (1.89) (1.24) (0.18) 
Constant 8.301*** 8.364** 11.847*** 8.288*** 7.365** 12.325*** 
 
(3.24) (2.25) (2.99) (3.22) (2.03) (3.38) 
       Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) 0.77 0.68 0.56 0.77 0.66 0.53 
Hansen 0.78 0.7 0.69 0.79 0.66 0.68 
Obs. 14,438 7,509 6,929 14,438 7,509 6,929 




Table 9: Government subsidy and firm performance. 
This table reports random-effects regressions using the propensity score-matched sample. We use the PSM method 
to match firms receiving subsidies against firms not receiving subsidies, classified by “Sub. Dummy,” using Gov. 
Control, No1SH, Log(Market Cap.), Tobin’s Q, return on assets, industry and year dummies as matching variables. 
All regressions control for firm effects and year effects, and t-statistics in brackets are based on robust standard 
errors clustering on firms. Other control variables included in these models (but not reported to conserve space) are 
the log of market capitalization, financial leverage, return on assets, sales growth rate, the government control 
dummy, the percentage shareholding of the largest shareholder, and the size and the independence of the board. To 
reduce endogeneity concerns, the dependent variable in Panel A is one-year-ahead Jensen’s alpha, and in Panel B is 
one-year-ahead Tobin’s Q. See Appendix A for variable descriptions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Panel A: Subsidies and one-year-ahead stock return Jensen’s alpha 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Sample All Overinvested Underinvested All All 
Sub Dummy -0.035*** -0.042** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.023** 
 
(-3.71) (-2.55) (-2.77) (-3.28) (-2.15) 
Div/Assets 
    
0.015*** 
     
(4.99) 
Sub Dummy*Div/Assets 
    
-0.010*** 
     
(-2.80) 
Inv.Eff 
   
0.001** 0.001** 
    
(2.05) (2.12) 
Obs. 9,663 3,938 6,504 8,884 8,884 
# Firms 2,085 1,702 1,975 1,901 1,901 
            
Panel B: Subsidies and one-year-head Tobin's Q 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Sample All Overinvested Underinvested All All 
Sub Dummy -0.389*** -0.475*** -0.393*** -0.382*** -0.263*** 
 
(-5.69) (-5.42) (-4.58) (-5.27) (-3.35) 
Div/Assets 
    
0.089*** 
     
(5.19) 
Sub Dummy*Div/Assets 
    
-0.109*** 
     
(-5.69) 
Inv.Eff 
   
-0.000 0.000 
    
(-0.03) (0.08) 
Obs. 9,721 3,952 6,548 8,942 8,942 




Appendix A: Description of variables. 
Sub. Dummy A dummy variable that equals 1 for firm-years with public subsidies or 0 if no 
subsidy is received. 
Sub/Assets The value of subsidies scaled by the lagged total assets. 
R&D Sub/Assets The value of subsidies to research and development activities scaled by the 
lagged total assets. 
Log(1+Sub) The natural logarithm of the value of subsidies plus 1. 
Inv/Assets The value of capital investment scaled by the lagged total assets. We follow 
Chen et al. (2011b) to measure Chinese firms’ investments as cash payments 
for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets from the cash 
flow statements minus cash receipts from selling these assets. 
Inv.Eff The measure of investment efficiency computed as the reversed absolute 
deviation of the actual investment minus the predicted investment in line with 




The measure of overinvestment (underinvestment) equals firm-year 
investment minus model predicted investment (model predicted investment 
minus firm-year investment) for the respective overinvested and 
underinvested subsamples. 
Payer Dummy A dummy that equals 1 for cash dividend payers or 0 for non-payers. 
Div/Assets The value of total cash dividend paid scaled by the lagged total assets. 
Log(Market Cap.) The natural logarithm of firm-year market capitalization of common stocks. 
Leverage The percentage of market value based financial leverage. 
Return on Assets The percentage of return on assets. 
Asset Tangibility Tangible assets as a percentage of total assets. 
Sales Growth The percentage growth of sales. 
Gov. Control A dummy variable that equals 1 for firm-years under government control or 0 
for firm-years under the control of a private investor/firm. 
No1SH The percentage of shareholding by the largest shareholder. 
Board Size The number of directors on the board. 
Board Ind. The percentage of independent directors on the board. 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ratio computed as the sum of market capitalization plus the book 
value of debt then divided by the value of total assets. 
Alpha Jensen’s alpha (annualized) computed as (Rit-Rf) – beta*(Rmt-Rf), where Rit is 
the annual stock return for firm i, Rf is the return on a one-year Chinese 
government bond, Rmt is the annual return on the Shanghai Composite Stock 
Index, and stock beta is estimated using daily stock and Shanghai Composite 
Stock Index returns. 
 
